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Abstract
An advantage of collective wage agreement is that search and business-stealing
externalities can be internalized. A disadvantage is that it takes more time before
an optimal allocation is reached because more productive firms (for a particular
worker type) can no longer signal this by posting higher wages. Specifically, we
consider a search model with two sided heterogeneity and on-the-job search. We
compare the most favorable case of a collective wage agreement (i.e. the wage that
a planner would choose under the constraint that all firms in a sector-occupation
cell must offer the same wage) with the case without collective wage agreement. We
find that collective wage agreements are never desirable if firms can commit ex ante
to a wage and only desirable if firms cannot commit and the relative efficiency of on
the job search to off- the job search is less than 20%. This result is hardly sensitive
to the bargaining power of workers. Empirically we find both for the Netherlands
and the US that this value is closer to 50%.
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1 Introduction
Under collective bargaining agreements (CBA), wages are determined at the industry
level rather than at the individual level. An advantage of collective wage bargaining is
that potential externalities can be internalized while a disadvantage is that the signalling
role of wages is eliminated which leads to a sub optimal allocation of workers over jobs.
To study this trade-off we need a model that allows for two sided heterogeneity and
search frictions. Heterogeneity is important because we are interested in the allocation
of workers. Search frictions are important because it takes time for workers to find the
production units where they are needed most and we will see that wages play a potentially
important signalling role.
This paper uses a circular model similar to Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Gautier,
Teulings and van Vuuren (2010). The idea is that worker (s) and job types (c) are located
on a circle and productivity is decreasing in the distance, x, between s and c.1 In the
centralized-wage setting case, all firm types, c, must offer the same wage while in the
decentralized case, firm types c are allowed to post different wages to different worker
types, s. We distinguish between contracts where firms can and where they cannot ex
ante commit to a wage schedule. One may argue that it is easy to write wage contracts
but contracts conditional on x are difficult to verify in court. Moreover, if renegotiation
is possible, ex ante commitment also becomes meaningless. When firms can commit ex
ante, the decentralized mechanism only becomes more favorable relative to the CBA case.
Gautier et al. (2010) show for the no-commitment case that firms engage in excessive
vacancy creation due to a business-stealing effect. The idea is that firms do not internalize
the output loss of firms they poach a worker from, in particular, they do not care whether
they destroy relatively good or bad matches. Although each worker’s transition is efficient,
the expected marginal increase in aggraded output is too low to justify the entry cost. In
the CBA case, the wage can be set at a level that generates the efficient level of entry.
However, if all firms in a sector pay the same wage, workers do not know which firms need
1The results of Gautier, Teulings and Van Vuuren (2005) show that without on-the-job search, the
circular model has the same characteristics as a Taylor expansion of the hierarchical model.
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their services most and once they have a job they stop searching. We are interested in
the trade-off between efficient entry and efficient allocation and which wage mechanism
is most desirable from a social welfare point of view.
The desirability of CBA mainly depends on the efficiency of on-the-job search relative
to off the job search (ψ). If employed job seekers receive more than 20% of the number of
offers as the unemployed workers (for the commitment case it is more than 10%), the cost
of CBA exceed the benefits. The reason for this is that the more efficient on-the-job search
is, the faster workers flow to the jobs where they are needed most and the more costly it is
if CBA prevents firms within an industry to signal with wages that they need a particular
worker type. We then use the ratio of job-to-job- to-unemployment-employment flows to
estimate ψ to be 0.45 for the Netherlands and around 0.5-0.75 for the US. In the range
of empirically feasible values of ψ, CBA is not desirable. We also simulate the model
for general bargaining power. CBA is less desirable if the worker ’s bargaining position
increases until the bargaining power is around 0.4. For β = 0, CBA is less inefficient than
for higher β’s (for the empirical values of ψ).
This paper is related to a number of other papers that study the effect of central-
ized bargaining in frictional labor markets. Pissarides (1986) asks whether the standard
search externalities will be internalized by a union. He finds that this is the case only
if the union’s policy is chosen by unemployed persons. If employed persons can influ-
ence the union’s policy, unemployment and wages will be too high. Other models that
have frictions and centralized bargaining include Delacroix (2006) and Bauer and Lingens
(2011). None of those models look at the trade-off between an efficient allocation and
internalizing externalities as we do. Finally, Krusell and Rudanko (2012) focus on union
wage setting rather than CBA’s. They assume that in the long run unions internalize
all externalities but in the short run, they raise current wages above the efficient level,
in order to appropriate surpluses from firms with existing matches. This implies that
the union wage policy is time-inconsistent. They allow wage for wage dispersion within
industries and occupations whereas in our CBA’s the wage is fixed at the job level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with the assumptions, derives
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the equilibrium conditions, and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 conducts welfare
analysis and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
Point of departure is Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Gautier, Teulings and van Vuuren
(2010). Worker (s) and job types (c) are locations on a circle with circumference 1. The
production technology has constant-returns-to scale so it is easiest to think of firms as
consisting of one worker. A matched firm-worker pair produces Y which depends on the
”spherical distance” between s and c: x(s, c) = min{|s−c|, 1−|s−c|}. Note 0 ≤ x(s, c) ≤
1/2. Specifically, Y (s, c) = Y (x). Since we interpret x as an indicator of mismatch
between works and jobs, Y (x) has a maximum at 0, and the value of the maximum is
normalized to unity: Y (0) = 1. Also we assume that Y (x) is twice differentiable and
strictly quasi concave. Since we treat the circular mismatch model as a simplified version
of a more general matching model, for example Shimer and Smith (2000), the derivative
of Y (x) at 0 should be 0. A simple example of the more general matching model would
be Y (s, c) = sc = 1
4
(s + c)2 − 1
4
(s − c)2. The first term could be thought as the average
productivity and the second term as indicator of mismatch. A simple functional forms
that meets those criteria is,
Y (x) = 1− 1
2
γx2.
As Gautier et al. (2010) argue, this functional form can be thought of as second-order
Taylor series expansion of a more general (differentiable) production function. Low values
of γ imply that a precise match is not very important, in the extreme when γ → 0, the
model reduces to a standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type of matching model with
identical workers and firms.
Assume that labor supply per s-type is uniformly distributed over the the circle and
that total labor supply in period t equals L(t). We also assume that vacancies are uni-
formly distributed over the circumference of the circle: v (c) = v, where v (c) is the number
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of vacancies per unit of c (one can show that this is an equilibrium). One can show that
this is an equilibrium. The value of non-market time is B. Labor demand is determined
by free entry of vacancies for all c-types. The flow cost of maintaining a vacancy is equal
to K per period.
We assume that ρ equals the population growth rate (golden growth) and that all
new workers start out as unemployed. The implications of this assumption are the same
as under assuming that the discount rate ρ is much smaller than the job-finding and
separation rate, ρ  δ, λ. This is a common assumption in the wage-posting literature
(see for example, Burdett and Mortensen,1998).
Next, we discuss the job search technology. Let m be the total number of contacts
between job seekers and vacancies per unit of labor supply, u the unemployment rate,
and v is total number of vacancies per unit of labor supply. Assume that the contact
technology is quadratic. Then,
m = λ [u+ ψ (1− u)]
The parameter ψ, 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1, measures the relative efficiency of on-the-job search versus
search while unemployed. Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) consider the case, ψ = 0 which
is related to the stochastic matching model of Pissarides (2000). If off- and on-the-job
search are equally efficient, ψ = 1 the model is relatively simple and analytical results
can be obtained. For general ψ = 0, we depend on numerical simulations. The overall
efficiency of the matching process is captured by λ. The Walrasian equilibrium is obtained
for λ→∞. Finally, we assume that matches between workers and jobs are destroyed at
an exogenous rate δ > 0.
We focus on two wage-setting schemes. First, in the centralized case, all firms of the
same type pay the same wage and to make this case as favorable as possible, we set this
wage optimally from a social point of view. In the decentralized case, we assume first that
wages are determined by bilaterally efficient bargaining between the worker and the firm
where firms cannot commit on future wage payments, see Coles (2001), Shimer (2006),
Gautier et al. (2011) and Coles and Mortensen (2011). So, firms pay only ”no-quit”
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premia but no ”hiring” premia. Second, we assume that firms can commit on a future
wage policy that is contingent on x in the current job. So, firms pay both ”no-quit”
premia and ”hiring” premia.
2.2 Job dynamics and asset values
Both under commitment and no commitment, workers will move in the direction of their
optimal job type and the laws of motion are the same. Therefore, we can first solve for
the worker flows and the asset values of vacancies, employment and unemployment for a
given wage setting rule. Under both wage mechanisms, wages are decreasing in x, as is
proved in Gautier et al. (2010). This allows us to write the wage schedule as a function
of x, W (x) rather than W (s, c). Denote by G(x) the fraction of workers employed at jobs
at smaller distance from their optimal job than x.2 Let x be the reservation distance
from their optimal job for an unemployed workers. Job located at a further distance are
declined. This implies that G (x) = 1. At the golden-growth path, unemployment and
employment must grow at the same rate. The inflow into the class of employed workers at
distance x or less from their favorite job minus the outflow from this class must therefore
equal the population growth rate:
2λvx {u+ ψ(1− u) [1−G (x)]} − δ(1− u)G (x) = ρ(1− u)G (x) . (1)
The first term on the left-hand side is the number of people that finds a job at a distance
less than x from the optimal job. The previous state was either from unemployment (the
first term in parentheses), or employed at a job located at a larger distance (the second
term in parentheses). The number of better jobs is given by 2vx, since the worker accept
jobs both to the left and to the right of the optimal job type s = c (or, equivalently,
x = 0). The second term in brackets is weighted by the factor ψ, reflecting the efficiency
of on-the-job search relative to search while unemployed. The final term on the left-hand
side is the outflow of workers from the class of matches with mismatch indicator of x or
less: δG(x). The right-hand side reflects that at the balanced growth path, employment
2We assume that at a tie, the worker moves with a positive probability; see also Shimer (2006).
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grows at a rate ρ at all levels including the class of workers with a mismatch indicator
smaller than x, G (x). Mobility within this class is irrelevant because the old and the new
match cancel. Steady-state unemployment can be derived from evaluating (1) at x.
u =
1
1 + κvx
, (2)
where κ ≡ 2λ
ρ+ δ
. (3)
Note that on the balanced-growth path, u and G(x) are constant. Substitution of (2) for
u in the balanced-growth condition (1) yields
G (x) = 1− x− x
(1 + ψκvx)x
. (4)
with the corresponding density
g (x) =
1 + ψκvx
x (1 + ψκvx)2
. (5)
Free entry implies that the option value of a vacancy of type c must be equal to K.
Define EGY ≡
∫ x
0
g (x)Y (x) dx and EGW ≡
∫ x
0
g (x)W (x) dx, then,
K = 2λ
∫ x
0
{u+ ψ (1− u) [1−G (x)]} Y (x)−W (x)
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvx
dx
=
1− u
v
(EGY − EGW ) . (6)
where in the CBA case, ψ = 0 and W (x) = W c. Starting off with the first equality, the
first factor in the integrand is the effective fraction of individuals u+ψ (1− u) [1−G (x)]
willing to accept a type x match. It equals the number of unemployed, u plus the number
of workers employed in jobs with a greater mismatch indicator than x, (1− u) [1−G (x)];
the latter number is scaled down with ψ to account for a lower effectiveness of on-the-job
search. The second factor is the value of a filled vacancy. Just as in the wage equation,
we discount current revenue Y (x)−W (x) by the discount rate ρ plus the separation rate
δ plus the quit rate 2ψλvx. The second line follows from substitution of the relations for
employment and unemployment. Multiplying (6) by v gives a simple interpretation of
this zero-profit condition: at any point in time, the cost of vacancies, vK, is equal to the
employment rate (1− u) times the expected profit in a filled vacancy, (EGY − EGW ).
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2.3 Decentralized wage setting with and without commitment
Let W (x) be the wage for a job with mismatch indicator x and let V U be the asset value
of unemployment. For the two wage mechanisms that we consider, we can write the asset
value for a worker holding a job at distance x from his optimal job type, V E(x) as
ρV E(x) = W (x) + 2ψλv
∫ x
0
[
V E (z)− V E (x)] dz − δ [V E (x)− V U] . (7)
The asset value for an unemployed job seeker satisfies the Bellman equation:
ρV U = B + 2λv
∫ x
0
[
V E (x)− V U] dx. (8)
For the marginal job, x = x, the asset value of the job is equal to the asset value of
unemployment: V E (x) = V U . Evaluating (7) at x and using the definition of g in (5)
gives
ρV E(x) = ρV U =
W (x) + ψκvxEGW
1 + ψκvx
=
uW (x) + ψ (1− u) EGW
u+ ψ (1− u) . (9)
The asset value in the marginal job is a weighted average of the wage in the current job
W (x) (the reservation wage) and the expected wage in the next job, EGW . Finally, we
can write the value of unemployment as a weighted average of the value of leisure B and
the expected wage3,
ρV U =
B + κvxEGW
1 + κvx
= uB + (1− u) EGW, (10)
where the final step uses (2).
Equations (2), (5), (6), (9), and (10) determine u, v, ρV U , x and G (x). The wage
function W (x) (which we need to derive EGW ) for the non centralized cases for general
bargaining power of worker β is derived in Gautier et al. (2011). Let W nc(x) be the wage
in the no-commitment case and W c in the commitment case. For the special case that
3Use the fact that the right-hand side of (7) and (9) are equal allows us to obtain an expression for∫ x
0
[
V E (x)− V U ] dx. Substitution of this expression into (8) allows us to write ρV U as a function of
W (x), which can be substituted out by solving (9) for W (x).
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β = 0, both are implicitly determined by the following differential equations in x.
W ncx (x) = −
ψκv [Y (x)−W nc (x)]
1 + ψκvx
(11)
W cx (x) = −2
ψκv [Y (x)−W c (x)]
1 + ψκvx
(12)
where the initial condition is given by (13). The factor 2 in (12) comes from the fact that
in equilibrium the no-quit premium is equal to the hiring premium (the latter is absent
under no commitment).
W i (x) = Y (x) = 1− 1
2
γx2, (13)
where i = c or nc.
Definition 1 The equilibrium consists of the set {u, v, x, W i (x), W i (x), G (x)} satis-
fying the equations (2), (4), (6), (10), (11) or (12), and (13).
The solution of the differential equation (12) for the commitment case is,
W c(x) = 1− γ
[(
1 + ψx
ψ
)2
log
(
1 + ψx
1 + ψx
)
− x
ψ
(1 + ψx)2
1 + ψx
+
x
ψ
+
3
2
x2
]
while for the commitment case it is,
W nc(x) = 1− γ
[
1 + ψx
ψ2
ln
(
1 + ψx
1 + ψx
)
− x− x
ψ
− 1
2
x (x− 2x)
]
.
See Gautier et al. (2011) for a proof.
2.4 Centralized wage setting (CBA)
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium if all firms are obliged to pay a wage that
arises through collective wage bargaining, W cb, then workers have no incentives to continue
searching on the job and x follows from the fact that at the marginal job, the worker gets
all the output,Y (x) = 1− 1
2
γx2 = W cb or
x =
√
2 (1−W c)
γ
(14)
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The value of employment is given by,
ρV E(W cb) = W cb − δ [V E(W cb)− V U] . (15)
The asset value for an unemployed job seeker satisfies the Bellman equation:
ρV U = B + 2λxv
[
V E(W cb)− V U] (16)
where 2λxv is the set of acceptable jobs.
By using the free entry condition, we can find the values of K for which an equilibrium
exists with a positive vacancy stock.
v =
1− u
K
(
EG˜Y −W cb
)
Note that because of collective wage bargaining, there is no on-the-job search in this en-
vironment, and consequently there are no job-to-job movements. So the new distribution
for mismatch x is,
G˜(x) = 1− x
x
This is a special case of Equation (4) with the on-the-job search parameter ψ set equal
to 0.
Proposition 2 Given a collective wage W cb, the equilibrium with CBA is characterized
by the following first order condition,
K
κu
=
2
3
√
2
γ
(1−W cb) 32 , (17)
where κ is given by Equation 3.
Proof. Combine Equations (2), (14), and (??)
From the above equation, it can be easily seen that the unemployment rate u is
increasing in W cb. A higher collective wage will lead to a higher unemployment rate.
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2.5 Efficiency
Define net output Ω as,
Ω ≡ (1− u) EGY + uB − vK (18)
= (1− u) EGY + uB − (1− u) v
v
(EGY − EGW )
= uB + (1− u) EGW.
Note the equality in the second line holds in both the decentralized wage bargaining and
the collective wage bargaining. The first term is actual output of the employed workers,
the second term captures the value of leisure of the unemployed job seekers, and the third
term is the cost of keeping vacancies open. Under free entry the difference between output
and wages goes into vacancy creation and the final step tells us that net output is equal
to the value of unemployment.
So far we haven’t specified any rule for wage determination in the CBA case. To make
comparisons, we assume that the wage in the CBA case is set to maximize the net output.
By combing Equations (17) and (18), the wage that maximizes net output satisfies,
K(1− 3
2
B) = κ
√
2
γ
(1−W cb) 32 − 1
2
KW cb.
In the next section, we will solve the model numerically for general β and ψ and derive
the conditions under which CBA is more desirable than decentralized wage setting.
3 Numerical simulations
In this section we first give a simple description of the numerical procedure that we follow
to solve the models, and then we present our main results.
3.1 When does decentralized wage setting performs better than
CBA
The main challenge of numerically solving the decentralized wage bargaining case without
commitment is that for general β, we don’t have an analytical solution for the wage
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Table 1: Parameter Values
λ 1 matching technology parameter ρ 0.01 discount rate
K 0.1 vacancy cost B 0.6 leisure value
γ 12 production function parameter δ 0.03 job separation rate
equation. In Appendix A we present the differential equation. In order to numerically
solve it we use a Chebyshev polynomial to approximate the wage equation. Given x and
v, we can find a polynomial minimizing the difference between the left and the right hand
side of (20) at the Chebyshev nodes. Then the program will search for x and v satisfying
the equilibrium conditions (6), (9), and (10).
We list the parameter values used in the model in Table 1. In the table, we left unspec-
ified the on-the-job search efficiency parameter ψ and the bargaining power parameter β
in the no-commitment wage case. The values of discount rate ρ, leisure value B, and the
job separation rate δ all have empirical counterparts, and are based on previous stud-
ies, for example Shimer (2005). The values of the scaling parameter λ in the matching
function, γ in the production function, and vacancy cost K are selected to match the
reasonable unemployment rate and the empirical variance of the matching quality x. The
latter criterion is also used by Gautier and Teulings (2011).
As proved in Gautier et al. (2010) when ψ = 1, the commitment case can achieve the
social optimal outcome. However, even when ψ < 1, for a large range of ψ values, the
social optimum and the wage with commitment case are almost indistinguishable. The
reason is that as long as ψ is sufficiently large, the workers do not lose much option value
by accepting a job offer. Furthermore, compared to the non-commitment case, there is
more competition for workers and therefore, vacancy creation is lower or absent and this
improves social efficiency.
If we compare welfare for all three cases, Figure 1 shows that when ψ is very small
(< 0.12), the optimal centralized wage performs better than the commitment case. This
threshold is higher for the no-commitment case. I.e. for ψ < 0.30, CBA outperforms
11
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Figure 1: Model Comparison
decentralized bargaining. For higher values of ψ, CBA is not desirable. The reason is
that it eliminates the incentive for on-the-job search which is crucial for social efficiency.
When ψ is small, the benefits of on-the-job search are also small. Firms can signal which
workers they prefer but they meet few workers anyway. Therefore the benefits of CBA
can in that case exceed the cost.
In the above analysis, we have imposed that the bargaining power parameter is 0.
Next we will relax the value of β and check the robustness of results with respect to β.
Since the empirical magnitude of β is unclear, in Figure 2 we present four cases:
β = 0.0, 0.1, 0.4 and 0.7. Starting at β = 0, increasing β, reduces the business stealing
externality. For β = 0.4, we see that even for ψ < 0.1, decentralized wage setting performs
better than CBA. As we increase β further, workers get inefficiently high bargaining power
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Figure 2: Model Robustness with respect to β
(for similar reasons as in Hosios, 1990) and we see that decentralized wage setting performs
less good (the threshold ψ above which decentralized bargaining performs better is now
0.45). The high bargaining power of workers leads to too little vacancy creation and too
high unemployment. Empirically, Gautier and Teulings (2012) show that observed wage
dispersion in the US can be well explained with β = 0 so we do not view this as a realistic
case.
3.2 How large is ψ?
Above, we saw that if we take the model serious, it is an empirical question whether CBA
is desirable and this mainly depends on ψ. Below, we show that for both the Netherlands
and the US, ψ is above the threshold, implying that CBA reduces welfare.
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Nagypal (2005) and Gautier and Teulings (2011) derive how ψ can be estimated from
observed labor market flows. Let fue be the unemployment-to-employment flow and fee
be the employment-to-employment flow. Then,
ufue = 2λ (1− u) ,
(1− u)fee = 2
∫ x
0
ψλ (1− u) g (x)xdx = 2λ (1− u)
(
1 + ψx
ψx
ln (ψx+ 1)− 1
)
,
fee
fue
=
u
1− u
(
1 + ψx
ψx
ln (ψx+ 1)− 1
)
=
1 + ψx
ψx2
ln (ψx+ 1)− 1
x
.
Gautier and Teulings (2012) argue that for the U.S., fee
fue
varies from 0.076 to 0.132 (de-
pending on which data one uses and whether one targets the average or median worker)
implying that ψ ' 0.75. From Gautier et al. (1999), for the Netherlands we have
peu = 0.039 and pee = 0.0592, implying that the on-the-job search efficiency parameter
for the Netherlands is 0.45. Both are higher than the threshold, implying that the net
benefits of collective wage bargaining are negative even if β = 0 and firms cannot ex ante
commit to wages contingent on x.
The above analysis considers the on-the-job search intensity for the whole economy. If
the labor market is segmented, then we can apply the above analysis to the sub-markets.
For example, we might expect that workers who are capable of complex jobs will search
only within that job category. In Table 2, the whole labor is divided by two different
criterions: education of workers and job complexities. The data is for the Netherlands
and from Gautier et al. (1999). We can see that only for the complex job category, if
β < 0.1 and if there is no commitment, that decentralized wage bargaining CBA could
perform slightly better but this is also the segment where in practice wages are not set
collectively. For all other cells, decentralized wage setting performs better than CBA.
4 Final remarks
In this paper we used a search model with ex ante heterogeneity to derive a threshold on
the relative efficiency of on-the-job search below which centralized bargaining agreements
are desirable. The empirical estimates for both the Netherlands and the US in the relevant
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Table 2: On-the-job search parameter values for different categories
Category peu pee ψ
simple job 4.08 6.67 0.5087
intermediate job 3.70 5.95 0.5237
complex job 4.41 4.92 0.2473
worker: low education 4.20 5.96 0.3835
worker: intermediate education 3.54 5.37 0.4798
worker: higher education 3.51 5.75 0.5591
segments are above this threshold (even if the bargaining power is 0) implying that the
cost of CBA (the economy moves slower to the optimal allocation because wages loose
their signaling function) exceed the potential benefits (the business-stealing externality
can be internalized). If wages are inefficiently low, other instruments that do not reduce
mobility (like a minimum wage) are preferable over CBA.
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5 Appendix
A Wages under no commitment for general β
In this appendix we derive wages for general bargaining power and no commitment. The
derivations for commitment are very similar. Let F̂ (W ) be the survival function of the
wage-offer distribution (which for well known reasons cannot have mass points, see Burdett
and Mortensen, 1998). W (x) maximizes the following product,
W (x) = arg max
W
[
Vˆ E (W )− V U
]β [ Y (x)−W
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvxF̂ (W )
]1−β
.
Since Vˆ EW (W ) =
[
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvxF̂ (W )
]−1
, we can write the first-order condition as,
β [Y (x)−W (x)] = (1− β)
[
Vˆ E [W (x)]− V U
]
×[
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvxF̂ [W (x)] + 2ψλvxF̂W [W (x)] [Y (x)−W (x)]
]
,
Since Y (x) is decreasing in the distance x, W (x) is decreasing in x. Therefore,
V E (x) ≡ Vˆ E [W (x)] ,
2vx = v̂ [W (x)] .
The second line follows from the uniformity of unemployed workers and of vacancies.
Using the chain rule gives,
V Ex (x) = Vˆ
E
W [W (x)]Wx (x) ,
2v = v̂W [W (x)]Wx (x) . (19)
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Substitution of (19) and the expression for Y (x) in the first order condition and rear-
ranging terms yields
Wx (x) =
2 (1− β)ψλv [1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)] [V E(x)− V U]
β
[
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)]− (1− β) [V (x)− V U ] (ρ+ δ + 2ψλvx) . (20)
We solve this differential equation numerically.
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